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FINDING THE PRODUCT/MARKET FIT 
Lean Canvas framework as a tool for establishing customer-validated market 
orientation in early-stage startup businesses 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia malleja sekä tietoperustaa startup-yrityksen 
markkinakelpoisuuden ja liiketoiminnan skaalauspisteen määrittämiseksi, sekä laatia tutkitun 
tiedon pohjalta koherentti ja tutkittuun tietoon perustuva rakenteellinen etenemisehdotelma 
kyseiseen pisteeseen (eng. Product/Market fit) pääsemiseksi. Työ keskittyy ennen muuta 
digitaalisessa ympäristössä toimivien yritysten toimintamallien optimointiin, mutta on muutoksin 
sovellettavissa myös perinteisemmille yritystoiminnan aloille, kuten teollisuuteen. Prosessin 
taustaideologiana toimii ns. lean startup-menetelmä, joka on tunnettu konsepti liiketoiminnan 
kehittämisen alalla. Opinnäytetyön tietoperustana on käytetty tieteellistä kirjallisuutta sekä 
akateemista tutkimusta pääasiassa 1990- ja 2000-luvuilta, muutamiin pääteoksiin nojaten. 
Työssä esitelty prosessi perustuu jatkuvaan testausdatan hyödyntämiseen sekä moniportaiseen 
asiakasvalidaatioon. Sen keskeinen elementti ja aloituspiste on lean-kangas (lean canvas) - 
yksisivuinen ja yhdeksästä segmentistä koostuva liiketoimintasuunnitelma, jonka eri 
segmenttejä testataan ja validoidaan potentiaalisten asiakkaiden parissa jatkuvasti oppien ja 
kehittäen. Prosessin tavoitteena ei ole rakentaa kerralla valmista tuotetta, sillä suuren 
epävarmuuden vallitessa on suuri todennäköisyys rakentaa jotain, mitä markkinoilla olevat 
potentiaaliset asiakkaat eivät halua tai tarvitse. 
Tavoitteena onkin rakentaa ensin pienin ja kevyin mahdollinen elinkelpoinen ratkaisu, joka 
vastaa asiakkaiden ongelmaan (Minimum Viable Product, MVP). MVP-konseptin tarkoituksena 
on tarjota vain ”riittävän hyvä” ratkaisu ongelman ratkaisemiseksi, jotta tuotteen 
markkinakelpoisuutta päästään testaamaan mahdollisimman pian. Järjestelmällisten kokeilujen 
ja asiakkaiden parissa validoidun datan perusteella tuotteen käytettävyyttä parannetaan ja 
ominaisuuksia lisätään huolellisesti analysoiden niin, että lopulta tietyt liiketoimintamittarit 
viestivät tuotteen ja liiketoiminnan skaalauskelpoisuudesta laajemmalle markkinalle.  
Startup-yrityksen rakentaminen on jatkuvien paineiden ja lähes kaoottisen epävarmuuden alla 
tapahtuvaa systemaattista ja tehokasta ongelmanratkaisua, johon harvoin on eväitä ilman 
tarkkoja prosesseja. Yhteiskunnan ja poliittisen konsensuksen arvostuksen lisäämiseksi 
tieteellinen tutkimus ja dokumentaatio aiheesta olisi elintärkeää, ja tämä opinnäytetyö on pieni 
osa tätä tutkimusta. 
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FINDING THE PRODUCT/MARKET FIT 
Lean Canvas framework as a tool for establishing customer-validated market 
orientation in early-stage startup businesses 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the models and the knowledge of defining a systematically 
validated point in the development of the venture where scaling the business can be started and 
the product successfully satisfies the needs of the market (the Product/Market fit). Based on 
that research, a viable, coherent structure on how to reach that point in the business 
development of the company is constructed and introduced. 
The thesis primarily concentrates on optimizing the functions of business and product 
development of digitally oriented businesses, but can be applied to certain more traditional 
industries. The ideological background of the thesis relies on lean startup -methodology, which 
is a well-known concept of developing startups. The theoretical basis of the thesis mainly 
consists of business literature and academic research from 1990’s and 2000’s, grounded on a 
few principal pieces. 
The process introduced in the thesis is based on constant utilization of testing data and 
continuous customer validation. The central element and the starting point of the process is the 
lean canvas - a one-page business plan consisting of nine segments that are tested and 
validated with potential customers along with constant learning and agile product development. 
The objective of the process is not to build a complete product at once, as high uncertainty 
dominates the environment and the risk to build a product that the potential customers do not 
want or need is prominent. 
The goal is to build the smallest and lightest viable solution that solves the problems of the 
customers - a Minimum Viable Product, MVP. The purpose of the MVP-concept is to only offer a 
”good enough” solution to the problem, in order to enable the iteration towards Product/Market 
fit as soon as possible. Through systematical experimentation and customer-validated data, the 
usability of the product is improved and  extra features are developed until certain metrics point 
to the scalability of the business to a larger market. 
Building a startup company is essentially systematical and effective problem-solving in the midst 
of constant pressure and uttermost uncertainty. A viable business can hardly be built without 
precise structures and explicit procedures. In order to improve the valuation of these themes in 
the society and political consensus, academic research and documentation is vital. This thesis 
is a part of this research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis studies the models of finding a customer-validated market orientation in 
small-sized startup businesses. This iterated, systematically established point where 
the business can be started to scale up is called the product/market fit.  
The product/market fit is an outcome of continuous engaging of customers throughout 
the product development cycle as well as testing, pivoting, and applying the Lean Can-
vas strategy in order to maximize the efforts for speed, learning and focus.  
The product/market fit is also a valuable breakthrough in order to raise funding for a 
venture. The start-up marketing and product development strategies of placing a ”Mi-
nimum Viable Product” and, unique value proposition, as well as finally reaching pro-
duct/market fit are investigated in this particular thesis. 
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2. STARTUPS 
First, it’s by all means necessary to define the meaning of a startup company. A startup 
is a relatively new term that established itself around the 1990’s and early 2000’s as 
the Internet got widely adopted in the world. It can be stated that some of the very early 
startups have been such companies as Ford Motors or Hewlett-Packard, as they did 
apply some of the frameworks, practices and processes of building a business that 
have later been documented and presented as models for building a startup business. 
From this perspective, startups have existed for many decades or even centuries, but 
only with the recent research and knowledge we have been able to define the meaning 
of the term. 
Surprisingly enough, no clear and simple definition for a startup is stated in the acade-
mic literature. The definition of a startup has to be drawn from business literature. Two 
well renowned and greatly appreciated thought leaders, Steve Blank and Eric Ries, 
have defined startup in ways that function as a definition for the term ”startup company” 
or ”startup” in this thesis. Blank (2012) defines a startup as a temporary organization in 
search for a scalable, repeatable and profitable business model. Ries (2011), on the 
other hand, acclaims that a startup is a human organization to deliver a product or a 
service under conditions of extreme uncertainty. 
Based on these two definitions, the following definition of a startup is applied in this 
thesis: 
Startup is a temporary human organization searching for a scalable, repeatable 
and profitable business model for a product or a service, under conditions of ex-
treme uncertainty. 
In addition, it is important to note that every startup has a founding team consisting of 
one or more founders. 
2.1 Startups’ characteristics 
A startup is essentially any form of an entrepreneurial venture - often confused with 
”Software As A Service” (SaaS) ventures, which refers to a subcategory of startups. 
While SaaS -ventures as well as other forms of software startups do form a prominent 
part of all startup companies worldwide, a startup doesn't always have to look for 
software products in order to be a startup. 
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Startups do share the following main characteristics: 
1. Youth and immaturity  
2. Limited Resources  
3. Multiple Influences  
4. Dynamic Technologies and Markets (Sutton, 2000).  
A major amount of startups are relatively young and only possess a small amount of 
experience but many startup founders do have relevant business experience from their 
pre-startup careers (Sutton, 2000). Some founders of startups have founded several 
previous startups and pursued different goals, and their career consists of building 
companies again and again. This form of being a startup founder, yet not unusual in the 
industry, lacks an academical definition and can be seen more as a way of life than a 
definitive profession. The usual expression for these startup founders is ”a serial ent-
repreneur”. 
The relatively limited resources of startups are typically concentrated on outbound acti-
vities: product release, product promotion and building strategic partnerships (Sutton, 
2000). Scarce human resources of startups also limit their abilities to invest in product 
research and development, as well as in customer involvement methods. 
In its early stage, a startup can be very sensitive to various influences from outside of 
the venture; such as potential investors and venture capitalists, as well as customers, 
partners and competitors (Sutton, 2000). The inconsistency of such influencers can 
cause business strategy -related problems. Proactive listening of outside collaborators 
can be valuable, mut experts argue that the founders usually do know the best what 
they are to do next with their respective venture. The high amount of uncertainty and 
the lack of knowledge on market segments and customer needs often characterize a 
typical startup. Startups are often backed by venture capitalists and share the following 
characteristics: 
1. New, non-existing market  
2. New business  
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3. Breakthrough product  
4. Opportunity to start small and grow  
5. Dynamic business model  
6. High growth potential. (Watts, 2001) 
7. Shorter time to market than non VC-backed companies (Hellman & Puri, 2000). 
These types of characteristics of startups can potentially result in discontinuous innova-
tions. Discontinuous innovations can be radical innovations or absolutely new innova-
tions (Garcia & Calantone, 2002) and tend to possess at least one of the following att-
ributes: 
1. 5-10 times improvement in performance compared to existing products  
2. 30-50 percent cost reduction or  
3. New-to-the-world performance feature (Rice, O’Connor, Peters & Morone, 1998). 
According to some researchers startups can be divided into two subcategories: innova-
tors and imitators. Innovators are the first to introduce a new product to a market while 
imitators seek to build products and services that do have existing and established 
competitors in the market but look forward to compete with them feature-wise (Hellman 
& Puri, 2000). Imitators are necessarily not better than existing alternatives, but they 
tend to provide solutions to markets where the original innovators are not yet present. A 
well-known example of an imitator company builder is the German Rocket Internet 
(www.rocket-internet.com). 
One of the most prominent experts in the field, Eric Ries, states that startups essential-
ly are powered by three core drivers: 
1. The use of open source platforms and free software 
2. The application of agile product development methodologies (in order to reduce was-
te and unlock creativity) 
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3. Rapid, customer-centric iteration of products and services under construction, via 
proactive utilization of customer segment feedback. (Ries, 2008) 
Various definitions of startups exist, and startups are described for instance ”compa-
nies that work to solve a problem where the solution is not obvious and success is not 
guaranteed” or simply just ”a state of mind”. American Heritage Dictionary suggests the 
following definition: 
1. The act or process of setting into operation or motion. 
2. A business or undertaking that has recently begun operation (American Heritage 
Dictionary, 2017) 
Many experts claim, though, that the age of the venture is rarely seen as a definitive 
factor, although some state that a five year old company can still be a startup where as 
ten years can not. Experts collectively agree that the main attributes of a startup are 
the ability to grow and scale and the tendency to adapt technology to solve problems 
(Robehmed, 2013). 
A startup is a venture aiming for an impact and has its finger on the pulse of the future. 
The term ”startup” directly points to a certain freshness and innovativeness. 
2.2 The differences between startups and established firms 
Startups tend to be different from established firms. Whereas companies that have gai-
ned their leverage on the market and have successfully established a solid business to 
scale and grow often search for predictable financial results and have a low need for 
new innovations (Watts, 2001), startups backed by venture capital want, and even 
need to, take risks and provide innovation. This is the inevitable outcome caused by 
the venture capitalist expectations: they expect their investment selections to provide 
substantial returns. 
In addition, the compensation systems in startups and established firms are different 
from each other. Whereas compensations in startups are usually based on stock ow-
nerships, in established enterprises they tend to rely on salary (Watts, 2001). 
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It could be stated that startups have significant disadvantages in comparison to es-
tablished firms, but they also do possess prominent advantages. Established compa-
nies can be more or less stuck with platforms and technologies they have been using 
ever since and that their customers already value (hence the low need for innovation 
when the business does well) (Christensen, 1997). Disruptive solutions tend to be va-
lued more in emergent markets (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). Established en-
terprises are often primarily focused on addressing their existing customers’ needs rat-
her than business opportunities in markets where potential customers’ needs can be 
difficult to define. Introduction of new products and services in markets already occu-
pied could, in turn, lead to cannibalizing the sales of existing innovations. Also the ma-
nagerial processes in many established organizations do not necessarily back up this 
form of disruptive innovation inside the company (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). 
Christensen & Rosenbloom (1995) have found that in incumbent companies the ability 
and incentive to create new applications for markets might be low. They suggest that 
startups perform better in product development that addresses customer needs. Dis-
ruptive innovations in emerging markets created by startups performed better than the 
ones brought to markets by established firms. The findings point out that startups have 
a great advantage and a serious opportunity to build valuable businesses in markets 
that are not essentially targeted by established firms. 
2.3 Where do startups come from? 
2.3.1 Creation vs. discovery 
Startup’s meaning of existence is to exploit various entrepreneurial opportunities in 
markets where businesses are expected to be profitable. Experts have yet to reach a 
mutual understanding on where these opportunities come from. The dominant perspec-
tive is that entrepreneurs actively discover these business opportunities, but it is also 
claimed than opportunities are rather created instead of being discovered (Suddaby, 
Briton & Si, 2015). The scholars defending the discovery theory investigate the world 
as ”real”, whereas creation theorists tend to view entrepreneurs as artists creating the 
opportunity. According to Ries (2011) and Blank (2012), for instance high-tech startups 
have unique characteristics that enable these ventures to be founded in different ways. 
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2.3.2 Key components of startup opportunities 
Startups are usually way more diverse and complex than their founders may claim in 
sales pitches. Park (2005) states that startups consist of three key components that 
have a great influence on their performance and initial ability to benefit from entrepre-
neurial opportunities in markets. The components are: 
1. The entrepreneur / the entrepreneurs (founders) 
2. Knowledge and experience and 
3. Technology (Park, 2005). 
2.3.3 The founders 
Startup founders are creative solution seekers motivated by meeting unmet needs and 
solving unsolved problems or improving existing products through innovation. Ent-
repreneurship is the result of the mentioned scenario, and can seem to happen acci-
dentally as well (Shah & Tripsas, 2007). Simon (1985) claims that effective problem 
solving is the consequence of valid knowledge that allows the entrepreneur to act wise-
ly in situations that require intuitive, rapid decision-making. He states that intuitive 
knowledge is the product of proactive training and learning via experience. Creative 
performance forms when calculated risks are taken, and the validity and accuracy of 
these risk evaluations is dependent on the founder’s knowledge. When risks are 
successfully calculated by the risk taker better than the competitors do on average, the 
gambling factor is reduced dramatically. 
2.3.4 Knowledge and experience 
In the era of continuous disruptive innovation enabled by the Internet, existing know-
ledge might not always be solely an advantage (Katz, Allen, 1982). For example in the 
software industry a successful development team can be the one with relevant expe-
rience in Internet software development, and therefore the team tends to be younger 
than in many other industries. (MacCormack, 2001). It is, however, widely agreed by 
scholars that prior knowledge has a positive effect on the performance of entrepreneu-
rial ventures more often than a negative one. This knowledge could be gained from 
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previous work experience, studies or personal life (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Sha-
ne6 (2000) found that previous knowledge of markets and ways to serve them, as well 
as understanding of customers’ problems are vital in order to successfully exploit ent-
repreneurial opportunities. 
Von Hippel (1988) stated that entrepreneurs establish new companies in order to solve 
customer problems that they have learned about from working with potential customers 
in previous workplaces. Bhide (1994) has studied the Inc. 500 list of fastest-growing 
companies, and has found in his studies that up to 71 percent of entrepreneurs were 
inspired in their pursue of new ventures by knowledge learned under previous emplo-
yment relationships. 
2.3.5 Technology 
One of the cornerstones of modern-era entrepreneurial activity is technology. It has a 
great impact on the chances of effectively recognizing venture opportunities (Shane, 
2000). Orientation to technology in marketing activities, for instance, is what distinguis-
hes many startups from established firms in various markets and industries. Startups 
tend to exploit technology that is cutting-edge, but with very limited resources (Julien, 
1995). By studying the research of Carayannis and Alexander (2002), as well as Park 
(2005) it can be said that many startups can vastly benefit from combining their capabi-
lity to learn new technologies with their understanding of customer needs. 
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3. WHAT IS PRODUCT/MARKET FIT? 
This thesis essentially studies the process of finding the product/market fit, a critical 
stage in the lifecycle of a startup company that enables the venture to start scaling - 
expanding the business in found segments with relevant problems to be solved and 
needs to be met. Before the process of finding product/market fit can be looked into, 
the concept of product/market fit needs to be defined. 
A straightforward, universal definition that would be mutually agreed by academic scho-
lars and scientific researchers remains to be unfound. One reason to this might be the 
relatively young age of many concepts and terms in the startup business world. One of 
the most prominent experts in this field, Marc Andreesen, has however attempted to 
define product/market fit and his 2007 definition is widely accepted in the particular 
field of study of startup businesses. 
Andreesen (2007) claims that in the broad range of startups in different industries, the-
re is great variation in the levels of success and competitiveness and a vast diversity of 
calibers and qualities of startup teams, products and markets. He states that the men-
tioned three terms are the core concepts needed to understand in order to effectively 
look into the meaning of product/market fit. He defines them in the following way: 
• The caliber of a startup team can be defined as the suitability of the CEO, senior 
staff, engineers, and other key staff relevant to the opportunity in front of them. 
• The quality of a startup's product can be defined as how impressive the product is to 
a customer or a user who actually uses it. 
• The size of a startup's market is the the number, and growth rate, of those customers 
or users for that product (Andreesen, 2007). 
Obviously, the perspective on the order of importance of these three factors is different 
depending on who is being asked from. Many will say that team is the most important 
factor because after all everything comes down to the people behind the startup, but 
for instance an engineer’s perspective on the issue could as well be more product-
concerned. Andreesen, nevertheless, strongly claims that market is the most important 
factor because in a great market with plenty of customer potential, the market pulls the 
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product out of the startup. He sees the market - the customers’ needs - as an organism 
that has an inevitable need to be fulfilled by the first viable product possible, whatever 
the need is. The market has zero interest on how good the team behind the product is 
as long as the solution works. Conversely, in a horrible market the entrepreneurs can 
have the best product in the world created by the best possible team, and the venture 
will eventually fail. Market consists of the customers and the customers have to exist in 
order for the business to bloom. 
Andreesen famously quoted the founder of the American venture capital firm Bench-
mark Capital, Andy Rachleff, presenting Rachleff’s Law of Startup Success, which has 
then been cited frequently in startup-related blog posts and conversation: 
1. When a great team meets a lousy market, market wins 
2. When a lousy team meets a great market, market wins 
3. When a great team meets a great market, something special happens (Andreesen, 
2007). 
Andreesen describes Rachleff more or less stating that the lack of market is the prima-
ry death cause of many startups. Therefore, one can fail on a great market but when 
equipped with a decent product and a competent team, a good market will tend to lead 
to success and poor market will tend to lead to failure. Likewise, neither a superb star-
tup team or a magnificent product will bloom on a poor market. Markets that don’t exist 
don’t care how smart you are, Andreesen concludes. Rachleff’s Corollary of Startup 
Success, withdrawn from his Law of Startup Success, is that the only thing that matters 
(in a startup’s success) is getting to product/market fit (Andreesen, 2007). 
Most of ambitious startup ventures fail before product/market fit ever is found, so star-
tup companies should focus solely on finding product/market fit before scaling the 
business. A startup’s life can be defined into two parts: before and after product/market 
fit. This thesis concentrates on the actions performed before finding the product/market 
fit, and the following definition by Marc Andreesen will be applied in this paper: 
Product/market fit means being in a good market with a product that can satisfy that 
market (Andreesen, 2007). 
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4. HOW TO GET THERE: THE LEAN CANVAS 
4.1 Lean 
Lean is a management and manufacturing philosophy that became famous in the early 
1990’s, when James Womack, Daniel Jones and Daniel Roos investigated the produc-
tion processes of Toyota in their book ”The Machine That Changed the World”. The 
book gained international attention, documenting Toyota’s principles to effective mana-
gement and manufacturing for the first time. 
Lean refers to minimizing waste without sacrificing productivity. It consists of five core 
parts, which are: 
1. Value definition is based on customers’ views 
2. The value chain is identified and everything that does not increase value will be re-
moved from the process 
3. The value chain should be solely based on suction control caused by customer 
needs 
4. Employers should be taken along to all development 
5. Organization’s continuous learning (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990).  
The roots of the term lie in various sets of principles of optimizing production chain in 
order to manufacture more products with less wasted effort (at Toyota this would ob-
viously mean more cars), but lean thinking has then been applied to many different 
areas of business and life in general, including for instance: 
• Lean management 
• Lean leadership 
• Lean services 
• Lean supply chains 
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• Lean software development 
• Lean marketing 
• Lean sales 
• Lean UX development 
• Lean analytics 
• Lean startup. 
From the viewpoint of this particular thesis, lean startup is an important concept to un-
derstand as lean startup methodology will be referred to throughout the following parts. 
4.2 Lean Startup and Lean Canvas 
Lean startup is a common methodology for business and product development in star-
tups. The core idea of lean startup is to shorten development cycles by proactive expe-
rimentation, continuous iteration and customer-validated constant learning (Penenberg, 
2011). The main hypothesis is that startup companies are required to invest time and 
effort into iterative building of products and services in order to satisfy the needs of ear-
ly adopters. By doing this the market risk will be reduced and expensive research and 
product launch investments can be avoided (Adler, 2011). 
Lean startup methodology was first created by Eric Ries, based on his experiences of 
integrating the earlier defined lean philosophy to high-tech startups (Ries, 2008). Ries’s 
highly recognized 2008 book, The Lean Startup, is one of the most fundamental pieces 
of work in this field, and naturally a major inspiration for this thesis as well. 
Another renowned expert of lean startup, Steve Blank, has stated that a technique cal-
led discovery-driven planning has also a prominent source of inspiration for lean star-
tup methodology (Blank, 2013). 
The lean startup methodology, as the earlier presented concept of lean manufacturing, 
aims to reduce waste in product and business development loops to zero (Ries, 2011). 
Only customer-validated, value-producing practices are effectively continued. This vali-
dation is executed through proactive seeking of customer feedback, both qualitative 
and quantitative, and using key performance indicators based on relevant metrics in 
each stage of the startup (Tam, 2010). Customer feedback is exceptionally important, 
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as it produces the evidence on whether the startup is designing features that the poten-
tial customers really want to have or not (Adler, 2011). The aim of the lean startup 
process is to avoid time-taking business plans, costly perfectionism in product deve-
lopment and the need of large funding from venture capitalists or other third-party in-
vestors (Schonfeld, 2011). 
The core idea of lean startup is to assess the actual and accurate demands of potential 
customer segments and find ways to meet this demand using the lowest possible 
amount of resources (Loizos, 2011). 
4.2.1 Minimum Viable Product (MVP) 
Startups often do not possess the resources to invest vast amounts of time and money 
to an elaborate product (Adler, 2011). The risk of failure is simply too likely to unfold. 
This is why an ”MVP” - a Minimum Viable Product - is a critical stage of lean startup 
methodology -based product development (Ries, 2011). 
According to Ries (2011), a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) is the ”version of a new 
product which allows a team to collect the maximum amount of validated learning 
about customers with the least effort”. The primary objective of an MVP is to pressure 
test business hypotheses and assumptions and to help the founders of a startup to get 
acquainted with the learning process in the earliest stage possible (Ries, 2009). 
4.2.2 A/B testing 
An A/B test is an experiment in which ”different versions of a product are offered to cus-
tomers at the same time” (Ries, 2011). 
The goal is to document and evaluate differences in customers’ behaviors by dividing 
them to separate control groups. This is how the founders are able to observe, measu-
re and analyze the impact of variants and versions of the product. 
4.2.3 Actionable metrics and vanity metrics 
Actionable metrics are data that enables the founders to make validated business de-
velopment decisions (Ries, 2009). 
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Vanity metrics are data that do not exactly mirror the startups key drivers. The relevant 
difference is that actionable metrics are pieces of measurable information that accura-
tely reflect the objectives of the earning model, while vanity metrics produce no direct 
correlation between the metric and the revenue. One example of a vanity metric could 
be for instance ”the number of new users gained per day”. A notable number of new 
users gained per day easily seems to benefit any given business, but does not give 
insight on the cost of acquisition of each new user. Therefore, it’s rather a vanity metric 
than an actionable one, because if the cost of acquisition is higher than the gained re-
venue, the venture is not profitable and the business not on a solid base. 
4.2.4 Pivot 
Steve Blank defines a pivot as ”changing or firing the plan instead of the 
executives” (Blank & Dorf, 2012). 
Eric Ries defines a pivot as a ”structured course correction designed to test a new fun-
damental hypothesis about the product, strategy and engine of growth” (Penenberg, 
2011). That being said, pivot actually means establishing a completely new approach to 
the problem, or even attempt to solve a different problem that the initial one, if the ori-
ginal strategy produces little or no results. One well-known example of a successful 
startup pivot is Groupon. Groupon was originally founded as The Point, an online acti-
vism platform for social collaboration, but gaining only minor results, the founders pivo-
ted to launch a coupon promotion platform built on a WordPress blog site. The first 
coupon promotion only managed to allure 20 sign-ups, but Groupon founders quickly 
understood that this was a start to something bigger. In only three years or so, Grou-
pon’s net worth would grow to a billion dollars (Ries, 2011). 
4.2.5 The Build-Measure-Learn loop 
The Build-Measure-Learn loop is vital for lean startup company’s ability to quickly itera-
te products and services. The term refers to a learning cycle of utilizing feedback and 
creative input to build consequent product versions and measure their impact on the 
market. In the Build-Measure-Learn loop consists of three essential parts: 
1. Building product versions based on feedback and/or new ideas 
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2. Measuring customers’ and potential customers’ reactions and behavior against the 
product versions 
3. Learning via the information gathered and making decisions whether to persevere or 
pivot the idea (Maurya, 2012). 
Picture 1. The Build-Measure-Learn -loop (Hypeinnovation, 2016) 
This rapid cycle of iteration and product improvement enables the startup to eventually 
discover the product/market fit and later fine tune and optimize the business when sca-
ling. 
4.2.6 Business Model Canvas 
The Business Model Canvas is a strategic management template documented by Alex 
Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur. It is invented to develop models for new businesses or 
improving existing business models. Business Model Canvas is a visual template desc-
ribing the outline of a business model and important elements, such as the value pro-
position and potential customers (Osterwalder, Pigneur & Clark, 2010). 
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Picture 2. The Business Model Canvas (Unicornomy, 2016) 
4.2.7 Lean Canvas 
The Lean Canvas is essentially an iterated version of the Business Model Canvas, 
adapted by Ash Maurya. It is specifically modeled for early-stage startups. It focuses on 
addressing potential customer problems and solutions for them via a documented vi-
sual chart that replaces the traditional business plan (Maurya, 2012). 
The Lean Canvas, being one of the major cornerstones for a modern startup to ever 
reach product/market fit, is carefully examined in the next part of this thesis. 
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5. HOW TO APPLY LEAN CANVAS AS A TOOL FOR 
FINDING THE PRODUCT/MARKET FIT? 
There are obviously multiple theories and sets of principles available for startup foun-
ders to gain knowledge on how to successfully establish a realistic roadmap on how to 
find the product/market fit. Ash Maurya, one of the very prominent experts on the field 
of building a startup, has created the concept of ”Running Lean”, a dynamic combina-
tion of Eric Ries’s Lean Startup earlier mentioned in this thesis, and Steve Blank’s fa-
mous Customer Development Approach. 
Maurya’s Running Lean is also examined in this thesis, as it offers a modern fra-
mework to establish customer-validated product/market fit in startups with high uncer-
tainty and limited access to capital in the early beginning of the company’s history-to-
be. 
Running Lean is essentially distilled into three steps: 
1. Documentation of ”Plan A” 
2. Identification of the plan’s riskiest parts 
3. Systematical testing of the plan via various experiments. 
These three steps will be covered in detail in this thesis.  
5.1. Documentation of ”Plan A” 
Many people with entrepreneurial mindsets are driven by passion and determination, 
but the passion-driven visions can not reach their full potential without solid and cons-
tant documentation of facts. Without proper testing of assumptions and hypotheses 
and multiple experiments, the venture is danger of becoming a faith-based passion 
project without a systematical roadmap.  
This being said, the first absolute step is writing down the vision and sharing it with ot-
her people. The traditional way of doing this would be to invest a decent amount of time 
and effort to write an average 60-something page business plan. The traditional plan, 
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though, tends to be very static and rigid and therefore doesn’t suit well for many star-
tups in need for rapid iteration loops and continuous experimentation. The form of 
choice of Running Lean is Lean Canvas - a flexible one-page business plan. 
 
Picture 3: The Lean Canvas (Blankcanvas, 2017) 
Lean Canvas is an adaptation of Alexander Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas. 
Lean Canvas is a superior choice of form for three main reasons: it is fast, concise and 
portable. While a traditional business plan can take weeks or months to produce, the 
Lean Canvas can be sketched in few hours or days depending on the effort put to 
brainstorming and prioritizing. The Lean Canvas forces its writer to pick the words care-
fully and get to the core of business very quickly. It is also easier to share with other 
people, meaning that more people will read it and the amount of potential feedback is 
therefore greater. This will lead to more frequent updating of the canvas. 
Maurya (2012) points out that entrepreneurs should view the entire Lean Canvas busi-
ness plan as the ”product”, instead of the traditional concept of a product that is sold or 
marketed. Understanding of this perspective allows the founders to ”own” the business 
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model and to apply various product development techniques to build the company, 
including Running Lean. 
Lean Canvas helps the entrepreneurs to deconstruct their business model into nine 
distinct parts, that can be systematically tested. 
5.1.1 Brainstorming possible customers 
In the very beginning, most startups only have an idea of a possible problem, an idea 
on what the solution to the problem could be like, and possibly an idea of a customer 
segment to start with. Picking a business model, a customer segment or rushing to 
build a solution for the problem has a big chance of leading to a untested product or 
service that no one really wants, so multiple segment groups have to be explored and 
experimented upon. According to the Running Lean theory, this early stage has four 
concrete phases: 
1. Distinguishing customers and users from each other: a customer is someone who’s 
paying for the product, while the user doesn’t. A product can still obviously have 
both. 
2. Splitting customer segments: One can't, at least not effectively, build and design a 
product for everyone. The segments have to be small enough to be realistically tes-
ted. 
3. Putting the customer segments on Lean Canvas: Maurya recommends, that building 
of Lean Canvas business plans starts with putting all the segments to one canvas 
with different colors, or other marks to distinguish them from each other. This is only 
recommended for visualization. 
4. Sketching an individual canvas for all the relevant segments: It is recommended to 
start with a handful of potential segments, obviously the most promising ones. An 
own Lean Canvas is to be sketched for each of these segments. (Maurya, 2012) 
5.1.2 Sketching the canvases 
The point of the first sketches is to do it quickly (in less than 15 minutes) - the idea 
being that the first sketch only gives a a decent snapshot on the entrepreneur’s vision. 
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Rather than spending vast amounts of time and effort to create a perfect initial busi-
ness plan, the goal should be to establish something to start with and something to de-
velop during the process. Therefore it's also allowed to leave some sections blank if 
needed. "I don’t know” is as correct of an answer as anything else. The canvas also 
should fit on one page, so certain conciseness is welcome. The best result is reached, 
when the entrepreneur sketching the canvas doesn’t try to predict the future and pon-
der upon various alternatives too much. 
In ”Business Model Generation”, Alex Osterwalder presents several techniques to ap-
proach a business model canvas, including customer-centric approach (Osterwalder, 
Pigneur & Clark, 2010). The Running Lean procedure relies heavily on customer seg-
ments and customer feedback, so it’s a natural perspective to begin with.  
Problem- and Customer-segments 
The problem- and customer -segments of the canvas pair to each other tightly, and in 
essence the decisions made on them tend to effect the rest of the canvas, so it’s advi-
sable to tackle them together first. This is made by listing the top 1-3 problems of the 
customer segment the canvas under investigation is meant to, as well as documenting 
existing alternatives - how competitors-to-be are or are thought to be addressing these 
problems. The existing solutions can be unobvius, as well: for instance, many online-
based tools for collaboration or document exchange would not find that their core com-
petitor is another online tool, but simply email. For many potential customers, the cur-
rent solution for a problem could also be to just ignore it. 
Next, other user roles need to be identified, as not everyone is a customer while they 
could well be users. For example for Google, the users are the people actively searc-
hing things from the internet, while advertisers are customers. The problem and custo-
mer segments should contain the needed information on all potential users, but 
concentrate specifically on customer segments narrow enough characteristic-wise, to 
define an early adopter rather than a mainstream customer. Defining early adopters’ 
attributes is key to building a viable product. 
Unique Value Proposition 
Unique Value Proposition is essentially a line of text to tell the audience what distin-
guishes the  respective product from other alternatives in the market. The Unique Value 
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Proposition often headlines the website of startup products. Maurya (2012) defines the 
Unique Value Proposition (UVP) as something that explains ”why you are different and 
worth getting attention”. An effective UVP can be crafted by utilizing the teachings of 
modern advertising theory; it has to be different from the competitors’ equivalents, but 
in immediate connection with the customer problem the product is attempting to solve. 
Likewise, the UVP’s core audience should be the early adopters. A decent UVP doesn’t 
list the features, but draws a picture in a reader’s mind on the benefits that the product 
offers. Careful copywriting and subtle exploring of other good UVP:s are obviously re-
levant tools for crafting an UVP. 
Channels 
One of the most common reasons of startup failure is that the entrepreneur is not 
successful in channel building - the customers don’t simply find the startup’s product. 
The channels, just like about anything else in the Lean Startup process of building a 
venture, can and have to be iterated during the process. Finding the correct channels 
in the very beginning is not a purpose nor a goal. Nevertheless, it’s absolutely vital that 
the scalable channels to enhance real growth are identified rather sooner than later. In 
early channels the attributes that matter vary to a great extent depending on the star-
tup’s industry et cetera, but some important notions can still be made. 
Firstly, no free channels exist - even the unpaid channels (such as social media ones) 
require a prominent investment of limited human capita in terms of time and effort. Re-
turn on investment -calculations can be challenging with such channels. Less 
complicated is the value determination of paid channels, for instance search engine 
marketing, but obviously they can be expensive yet still ineffective. The choice between 
unpaid and paid channels is an important question to ponder for an early-stage ent-
repreneur. 
Of great importance is also the decision on inbound and outbound types of channels. 
Inbound channels, such as whitepapers, webinars or ebooks ”pull” leads and custo-
mers organically via relevant content, whereas outbound marketing channels, for 
example advertisements, trade shows and cold calls, ”push” the messages directly to 
audiences.  
A startup also has to come up with an early plan on how to build its sales models. In 
general, automated sales outperform the direct, manual salesmanship in most products 
(the list of exceptions being long as well). An automation system lacks the capability to 
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learn, though, so direct sales tends to be useful for early-stage firms. The indirect sales 
strategy of partnering with a more established company in order to achieve a greater 
leverage in sales might sound like a good idea to many, but often fails as the sales reps 
of the mentioned larger company do not see the value of a brand new, unproven pro-
duct compared to the ones they are familiar with. The same problem applies to external 
salespeople, such as freelance growth ambassadors. 
In early-stage startup marketing, retention beats referral and affiliate programs in the 
very start. One must have something to spread the word about before the referral pro-
grams and viral potential can step in to the picture. 
Revenue Streams and Cost Structure 
What it comes to finances, instead of an overoptimistic two- or five-year forecast, an 
early-stage lean startup should concentrate on defining a reliable runway required to 
build a Minimum Viable Product before anything else. In revenue stream calculation, 
the most important factor to take a stand on is obviously pricing. The MVP might look, 
feel, or work like it’s not worth charging, or asking a price could be considered as em-
barrassing, but price is always part of the product.  
An MVP is not always synonymous with a buggy, laggy, halfway ready product - it just 
addresses the most important problems of a potential customer instead of a majority of 
them. If a product solves at least one problem of a person, it’s worth money - perhaps 
not a substantial amount but still money. Early start with pricing also accelerates initial 
learning and iteration. Free products make it ”too easy” for a customer to say yes on a 
buying decision, and validation of pricing (being one of the riskiest parts of Lean Can-
vas) gets delayed. The price-free MVP’s often hardly generate customer commitment, 
so asking for a price later on can be of extreme difficulty if the startup wants to keep its 
customers. That being said, only a few paying customers in the beginning might well be 
enough to provide enough vital information for validated iteration. Price is also a crucial 
marketing tool; it plays a grand role in selection of core segments. Some reference 
price anchors and insight on them might well be found from the existing alternatives 
hopefully mentioned in the Problem box of the canvas. 
The cost structure can be complicated to accurately compute, but a list of operational 
costs needed to credibly take the product to the market is still of high importance. The 
list ought to focus on the present situation rather than faraway future, and attempt to 
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count the needed capital to interview for example 50 customers or build and launch an 
early MVP. 
The revenue streams and the cost structure inputs, when calculated reasonably 
enough, can and have to be used to find a break-even point in which the startup pays 
for its costs and keeps itself alive. The estimate on how much time, money and effort is 
needed to get to the break-even point, in addition with a list of other things, define in-
vestor search input and further business strategy development. 
Key Metrics 
Virtually every startup does have certain key metrics that are used to measure the per-
formance of the venture. Metrics are used to measure the business progress, and, 
perhaps even more importantly, to detect certain ”hot spots” in the customer lifecycle. 
American angel investor and entrepreneur Dave McClure has sketched a reasonable 
model for investigating the key metrics relevant in different stages of the sales and 
marketing funnel. The model, informally referred to as ”Pirate Metrics”, depicts the fol-
lowing stages: 
1. Acquisition 
2. Activation 
3. Retention 
4. Revenue 
5. Referral 
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Picture 4: AARRR Metrics (Innovation Playground, 2013) 
Acquisition depicts the moment when an unaware visitor or similar is turned into a po-
tential prospect. In traditional inbound marketing, for instance, this point could be a sig-
nup on a website. 
Activation describes when the potential prospect gets acquainted with a gratifying user 
experience for the first time. This does not necessarily mean buying something, a first 
user experience could as well be any active contact with the business. 
Retention is engagement with the product, or ”coming back”. Retention is more than 
often one of the key metrics in finding the product/market fit. 
Revenue, as the headline promptly states, is the event of getting paid by the customer. 
In the referral stage, the metric points the events when a satisfied customer generates 
traffic of new potential prospects in the conversion funnel - shares, promotes and 
recommends the product to others. The widely used Net Promoter Score (NPS) is a 
one example of a decent Referral metric. 
Unfair Advantage 
Generally being the most difficult section of the Lean Canvas to fill up, the ”unfair ad-
vantage” is typically one of the last boxes to be explored. In order to describe a compe-
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titive advantage as ”unfair” to competitors, it has to be something else than pure featu-
res. Being the first in the market is necessarily not an advantage either - it certainly ta-
kes a lot of work and a good number of mistakes to succeed in that situation.  
Anything worth copying is likely to be copied, so competitors to follow might find their 
product/market fit easier than the pioneers in the respective market. Therefore, a real 
unfair advantage is something that cannot be easily copied or bought (Cohen, 2010). 
Solution 
When all of the other boxes of the canvas are full, the solution options are to be 
tackled. The solution box is essentially the product itself - and in the very beginning it’s 
smart to not sketch out anything too complicated to develop on in the later stages. A 
wise move is to attempt to define the very simplest thing that can be built to address 
the problem, considering the framework consisting of the details in the boxes filled. 
5.2 Identification of the plans riskiest parts 
5.2.1 Prioritizing where to start 
Risk 
Incorrect prioritization is one of the top contributors of waste - the very possible outco-
me is to end up making only marginal progress and get stuck in the later phase. Star-
tups are generally very uncertain, but uncertainty is not equivalent to risk. Uncertainty 
is the lack of complete certainty - the existence of more than one possibilities. Risk, 
however, is a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, cata-
strophe or an other undesirable outcome (Hubbard, 2011). 
When applied, the Lean Canvas model captures uncertainties and risks - but not all of 
the risks are equal to each other and therefore have to be quantified. Business model 
risk ranking is a key step in the process, as without any know-how on the scale of the 
possible outcomes of each risk, determining where to start and what to avoid is highly 
difficult. The probabilities of a specific outcome have to be compared to the associated 
loss if the risk realizes, and the payoff if it doesn’t. 
Maurya (2012) divides the risks of a startup into three categories: 
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1. Product risk: getting the product right 
2. Customer risk: building a path to customers 
3. Market risk: building a viable business. 
Tackling all of the mentioned simultaneously is a difficult task, so the have to be ran-
ked, based on the stage of the product, and tackled systematically. 
Business model ranking 
A highly important stage is laying the Lean Canvases created next to each other, and 
prioritize which of the models is the one to start with. The basic objective is to find a big 
enough market that can be reached with customers who need the product, and so can 
be built a business around. A systematical ranking of the models can be done by inves-
tigating the relevant perspectives on the Lean Canvas segments, and prioritizing them. 
The segments thought to be the most important ought to stand on the top of the list. 
Maurya uses the following weighting order: 
1. Customer pain level (the Problem segment): who needs the product most? 
2. Ease of reach (the Channels segment): if one of the models definitely has an easier 
path to customers than the other models do, it should be taken into serious conside-
ration. 
3. Price/gross margin (the Revenue Streams and Cost Structure segment): if one of the 
models is expected to maximize the margins compared to the others, it has to be 
noted - the fewer customers needed to reach break even, the better. 
4. Market size (the Customer Segments box): which of the models have the biggest 
potential market given the objectives of the business? 
5. Technical feasibility (the Solution segment): which one of the models has the most 
feasible solution from investment perspective? 
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External advice 
Another effective technique for risk control is simply seeking external advice. Hubbard 
(2011) refers to this with the method of ”Instinctive Bayesian Approach”. The Running 
Lean methodology heavily relies on fast learning via customer interviews, but when 
prioritizing risks advisor advice can also play a major role in finding the right course. 
Customers tend to have the right questions, advisors might have the right answers - 
their knowledge could emerge valuable in broadening or narrowing down customer 
segments and refining or outrighting business plans. 
An advisor could, for instance, be a potential investor or another entrepreneur with 
specific expertise. When interacting with advisors, specific open questions often pro-
duces the most applicable information: what does the advisor consider to be the ris-
kiest part of the plan? Have they confronted similar risks and problems? How would 
they test these risks and who would they recommend talking to next? 
The information produced by advisor interviews should not be considered as absolute 
validation or judgment - the founder has to maintain the ownership of the business plan 
and he or she is the one responsible of synthesizing the advisor intelligence into a co-
herent whole. 
5.2.2 Preparing for experimentation: The problem/solution team 
The original Lean Startup philosophy by Eric Ries sees traditional business depart-
ments as causes of unwanted friction. Instead, a problem team and a solution team 
should be formed. The problem team engages with the outside world - conducts cus-
tomer and advisor interviews, runs experiments et cetera. The solution team is respon-
sible of the in-house activities such as code writing, design development and so on. 
Obviously, heavy cross-functionality and good communication between teams is requi-
red. Together, they form the problem/solution team that is in charge of and accountable 
for the business development of a startup. 
The ideal problem/solution team in the early stage would be two to three people - that’s 
when communication stays fluent and the staff costs reasonable. More important than 
the number of the members is, though, that the right talent is accessible at all times. A 
startup can well be built alone, but this requires active ”work hacking” - schedule cont-
rol and timetable management. 
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Maurya (2012) states that the most important areas of expertise needed in the early 
stage are development, design and marketing: 
• The development expertise is heavily measured with prior experience in business 
development, along with skills in the respective technology 
• The design expertise consists of expertise in aesthetics and usability. A product is a 
collection of user experiences, and when function could beat form in some markets, 
how things look and feel are becoming increasingly important. 
• Everything else is more or less marketing. Marketing drives the external perception of 
a product: good copywriting skills along with solid understanding of metrics, positio-
ning, pricing and channels is vital when measuring relevant marketing expertise. 
Outsourcing some activities is an option, but should be examined with great doubt and 
careful consideration as that may tie the founders to certain third-party schedule re-
strictions and therefore slow down the iteration cycle. 
5.2.3 Effective experimentation 
The objective of a startup is to reach the product/market fit before running out of re-
sources, and in the core of this process are speed, learning and focus, When moving 
forward and being focused, but not constantly learning, the risk is that the venture is 
basically just going in circles. When focused on the correct things and learning effecti-
vely but lacking speed, the business is at risk of getting outpaced by competition of 
running out of resources. With the very same logic, learning a lot in fast speed when 
not staying focused could result in premature optimization: thinking that the product is 
viable when the product/market fit isn’t yet reached. The product/market fit is found by 
constant and effective experimentation. 
An effective experiment tends to focus on they key metric wanted to achieve or the key 
takeaways wanted to be learned.These, obviously, vary by the stage and nature of the 
product. Multiple goals and metrics can be tackled in the same experiment, but this can 
lead to confusion and waste. Experiments should also be as simple as possible - expe-
riment formulation should follow the simplest possible framework in order to test the 
hypothesis at hand. 
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Falsifiable Hypotheses 
The Lean Startup method is heavily based on scientific methods that require more fal-
sifiable or confirmable hypotheses than pure assumptions. A falsifiable hypothesis is a 
statement that can be clearly proven wrong (Maurya, 2012). When this step is ignored, 
it’s tempting to convince oneself that the hypothesis is correct, even when it should by 
all means be declared false. 
Qualitative validation, quantitative verification 
The terrain before reaching Product/Market fit is filled with extreme uncertainty. This is 
not only a challenging setup, but also a starting point full of opportunities. Having a lot 
of uncertainty at a moment, not a vast amount of data is needed to rapidly reduce it by 
a significant amount (Hubbard, 2011). This is an advantage for an early stage startup. 
The initial objective is to generate and identify strong enough signals that do not requi-
re a large sample size. A strong negative signal is an message that a hypothesis does 
not work, and has to be refined or abandoned. A strong positive signal, however, 
doesn’t necessarily indicate that the hypothesis could be scaled immediately - it only 
presents a clearance to move on forward so that the hypothesis at hand can be verified 
in the later phases with data gained by quantitative examination. This order of valida-
tion of hypotheses - first qualitatively and then quantitatively - is a key principle of Run-
ning Lean. 
Another highly important perspective to the business development of a startup is abso-
lute transparency of dashboards within the team. The objectivity brought by running 
experiments with company-wide access to data is vital (Stack, 1992). 
Constant communication of learning 
It’s also of extreme importance to periodically communicate the learning progress pro-
duced by the various experiments - Maurya (2012) recommends a weekly cycle with 
the inner team and a monthly cycle with external advisors and investors. This allows 
the entrepreneur(s) to reflect on findings with the team and prepare better for the next 
round of experiments. Ries (2011) calls this innovation accounting. 
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The iteration meta-pattern in risk control 
The experiments are key to tackling different risks. Some of them can be mitigated, but 
seldom completely eliminated through a single experiment. A lot of startups either pivot 
or abandon further examination because of the discourage suffered by negative lear-
ning, or get overoptimistic from positive experiences and ignore further testing required 
to build a viable business. The product/market fit is about more than ”building the right 
product” - in the core of it lies the scalability of the business model. Startups cannot 
blindly run experiments with aimless learning in mind - risks are only tackled via additi-
ve learning from staged iteration. The starting point is the Lean Canvas - the plan that 
should work. Methodical running of iterative experiments in each box of the canvas de-
fine the business development. With the following roadmap the risks can be tackled: 
1. Understand the problem: Conducting customer interviews to find out whether the 
problem is worth solving, why so, for who and how is it solved at the moment? 
2. Define the solution: Building a demonstration for visualizing the solution and testing it 
to learn if it works, who is satisfied and who isn’t and what would they be willing to 
pay for it? 
3. Qualitative validation: Building an MVP (Minimum Viable Product) and soft-launching 
it to early adopters of the product - can the UVP (Unique Value Proposition) be rea-
lized and does it generate revenue? 
4. Quantitative verification: Launching the product to a larger audience - is the product 
something that the people want to have, do sales scale up and is the business 
viable? 
The same roadmap can be viewed via the risk categories examined earlier - the pro-
duct, customer and market risks: 
Product risk: Product development 
1. Ensure you have a problem worth solving 
2. Define the MVP 
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3. Build and validate the MVP at small scale (demonstrate UVP) 
4. Verify it at larger scale 
Customer risk: Building a path to customers 
1. Identify who needs or wants the product 
2. Narrow the segment down to early adopters that need or want the product at the 
very moment 
3. Outbound sales 
4. Scalable sales via inbound channels 
Market risk: Building a viable business 
1. Identify the competition and set a reasonable price tag 
2. Test pricing first via getting qualitative feedback 
3. Test pricing in a larger scale and make interpretations from quantitative metrics 
4. Cost structure optimization to ensure profits (Maurya, 2012) 
The Unfair Advantage segment is truly not validated before facing competition, so befo-
re product/market fit it’s highly difficult to test. 
5.3 Customer interviews 
In Lean Startup business development, the swiftest way to accelerate learning is to talk 
to customers - customer interviews. This does not refer to surveys for various focus 
groups, but hands-on, face-to-face interviews with potential prospects in customer 
segments. The surveys tend to require a ready-made set of questions, which is 
problematic for early-stage startups as they normally do not know the correct questions 
to ask. In addition, conducting surveys also requires a prefabricated set of answers and 
formulating answer alternatives is impossible when not knowing the questions. Surveys 
lack the element of live interaction, which eliminates the possibility to examine body 
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language and other comparable external indicators. Crafted surveys bring their value in 
later phases, such as validating hypotheses quantitatively.  
Maurya (2012) has laid out some principles for an effective customer interview. He 
strongly highlights the importance of few notes - building an interview framework 
around asking open questions instead of a sales pitch, sticking to a script, picking a 
neutral location and asking for enough time. He also recommends face-to-face inter-
views without providing incentives to customers interviewed, not recording them, and 
documenting the results immediately after an interview. Taking someone along to the 
interview ensures that nothing vital in the answers is missed. 
5.3.1 Finding prospects to talk to 
Knowing the interviewee already makes the situation more comfortable, so first-degree 
contacts that fit the target group should be the people to start with. Later, it’s crucial to 
expand the network of interviewees by asking for introductions. The ”local card” might 
help as well - people generally like to talk to people they can identify with. One effective 
technique could be creating a ”teaser page” with the initial UVP and collecting email 
addresses or other contact details via subscriptions, but a lot of entrepreneurs prefer or 
have to stick to ”traditional” channels such as cold calling, LinkedIn and cold emailing. 
5.3.2 Different types of interviews 
The problem interview 
In the problem interview, the goal is to understand the customers’ views of the world 
and validate hypotheses related to problem- and customer segment boxes of the Lean 
Canvas. From the risk tackling perspective, the relevant questions attempted to get 
answers to are such as: 
• What is the customer problem that you should be solving (product risk)? 
• What are the existing alternatives and what’s the competition environment like (mar-
ket risk)? 
• What kind of people need or want the product most (customer risk)? 
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In order to clearly document the results, falsifiable hypotheses on these questions need 
to be formulated. A sequence for a problem interview could be of following structure: 
1. Welcome: brief the interviewee 
2. Collecting demographics: asking introductory questions in order to identify which 
customer segment the interviewee represents 
3. Telling a story: setting a problem context 
4. Problem ranking: laying out different problems and asking them to be ranked 
5. Testing the problem by exploring the customer’s worldview: how do they address the 
problems at the moment? 
6. The wrap-up: asking for a permission to follow-up, ensuring the interviewee main-
tains interest in the issue, and asking for introductions of referrals to find more poten-
tial prospects to be interviewed 
7. Documenting the results: each of the interviewers independently document the in-
formation gathered in the interview and de-brief later on. 
When the problem interview loop is running, results should be reviewed on a weekly 
basis to refine the problems. The problem interview stage is finished when three criteria 
are met: the entrepreneur is able to identify the demographics of an early adopter, a 
must-have problem and can describe the existing alternatives currently available. 
The solution interview 
After the problem interview stage, it’s vital to start collecting data to formulate a viable 
solution. The idea is to test the solutions with a demo before starting to build an actual 
product. At this point, the entrepreneur has a clear image on the problem and the pro-
duct’s existing alternatives (information from the problem interviews), so next questions 
to tackle would be: 
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• Who are the early adopters (customer risk)? 
• How will the company’s product solve their problems identified (product risk)? 
• What should be a sustainable pricing model to ensure revenue stream (market risk)? 
With a demo, the objective is to validate that the solution will solve their problem. The 
demo later defines the development of an MVP. The demo needs to be realizable and 
real-looking, but easy to build and quick to iterate. Possible mediums for a demo could 
be, for instance, videos or mock-ups when building a software product or other intan-
gible form of service, and sketches, CAD-models or early prototypes when building 
physical products. 
Testing the pricing model is an important step in the solution interview. When it could 
be tempting to simply ask what the prospect would be ready to pay for a product, this 
approach is puzzling because usually the economic justification of a non-existent pro-
duct is difficult to designate. 
Maurya (2012) states that in the solution interview stage it’s smart to mix up the old 
prospects that fit the early adopter demographic from the problem interview stage and 
have agreed with a follow-up actions, with new ones. 
A solution interview formula could be for instance the like of a following one: 
1. Welcome: brief the interviewee 
2. Collecting demographics: introductory questions to further qualify the early adopter 
segment 
3. Telling a story: setting a problem context 
4. Demonstrating the solution carefully: finding out which parts of the demo resonate 
the most, what is not that important and what features are clearly missing 
5. Pricing test: beginning with a starting price and making notes on possible hesitation, 
reluctance or direct approval 
6. The wrap-up: follow-up permission, possible concrete commitments and potential 
referrals on future interviewees 
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7. Result documentation 
As with the problem interview cycle, weekly reviews ought to lead to killing or adding 
features, confirming or starting over with hypotheses and refining the pricing model. 
The solution interview stage is done when the entrepreneur is able to (still) identify the 
demographics of the early adopter segment, still has a must-have problem to solve, 
can define the minimum features needed for the solution, has a price in mind that the 
customers would be willing to pay and, therefore, can think of building a viable busi-
ness around it. 
5.4 Getting to the MVP release 
This thesis, exploring the Lean Startup philosophy and the Running Lean method, has 
a strong emphasis on constant learning in business development. Most of this learning 
happens after the MVP (Minimum Viable Product) release, so getting to this stage 
shouldn’t take too much time from the start. The learning cycles related to the MVP re-
lease should begin as soon as possible after the pre-MVP interview stages. The first 
step required to be taken is to reduce the form of the MVP to the product’s pure es-
sence - when crafting the MVP a startup has to be building the smallest possible ver-
sion of the product. 
Each feature has to justify its existence in the MVP. The UVP (Unique Value Proposi-
tion) makes a promise on solving the customers’ most important problem, and the MVP 
is to deliver only on that promise, not anything else. In short, the potential features can 
be labeled as ”must have -features”, ”nice to have -features” and ”not needed 
features”. Obviously, the not needed features have to be eliminated immediately, the 
nice to have ones archived to backlog (unless the feature happens to be a requirement 
for a must have -feature), and the must have -features to be concentrated in. Feature-
related, possible specific customer requests brought up in the interviews should natu-
rally be considered as well. 
Maurya (2012) recommends a trial period, for example 30 days. This gives the ent-
repreneur extra time to worry about merchant accounts and other technicalities related 
to billing and payment collection. He also states that instead of wasting time on mere 
optimization, the focus in MVP release should be on accelerated learning, which the 
trial period allows (the optimization can be done when charging for the product). 
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5.4.1 Activation flow 
After deciding on a trial period and distilling the features list, an activation workflow 
needs to be constructed. The activation flow is essentially a funnel that describes the 
path customers take from the first signup to the first gratifying user experience. The 
activation flow should contain only the critical steps of gathering information on leads. A 
simple enough activation flow allows the entrepreneur to spot where the prospects 
drop off if they do, and enables effective troubleshooting. 
5.4.2 The marketing website 
The purpose of the marketing website is to sell the product. It’s the most crucial acqui-
sition driver. In its essence, the marketing website consists of a landing page that is 
followed by other pages constructed to encourage an unaware site visitor to move 
forward in the funnel and turn to a interested prospect. The landing page focuses on 
the UVP supported by visuals, with a straightforward call-to-action. The calls-to-action 
are vital on every page in order to drive traffic forward. Primary calls-to-action lead to 
the next funnel stage, secondary ones could produce extra information on the product. 
Other highly important pages on a marketing website are the ”About” -page and the 
”Terms of Service / Privacy Policy” -page. The About page contains information on the 
company, tells its story and allows for the customers to connect; its idea is to provide a 
compelling reason to not explore the competitors’ alternatives. Terms of Service and 
the Privacy Policy have to be adequate to meet the regulatory requirements, to avoid 
legal collisions. 
Some products, having technical information that the early adopters could find interes-
ting, could benefit from a tour page as well. The tour page provides specifications and 
details on the product. 
5.4.3 Measurement preparation 
When the customer lifecycle is successfully visualized and the marketing website is 
built up, the need to define metrics to investigate after MVP release emerges. The ter-
rain before product/market fit consists mostly of qualitative learning, but some actio-
nable metrics have to be followed in order to efficiently measure what the customers 
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do. The goal of the measurement is not to optimize conversion rates, but to identify 
problematic spots that the prospects get stuck with and then troubleshoot them. 
An actionable metric is a metric that ties specific and repeatable actions to observed 
results (Maurya, 2012). The opposite of an actionable metric is a vanity metric, which 
only documents the current state of the product but does not give information on why 
the state is such and how to iterate forward. Examples of vanity metrics are the number 
of website visitors or number of downloads of a piece of content. Alone, they might 
keep growing continuously but do not provide relevant insight into the business deve-
lopment without the other metrics around them. 
In addition, effective interpretation of metrics demands active communication with cus-
tomers. When disappointed with a user experience, customers rarely report on that 
proactively but rather just abandon the product and forget its existence. They have to 
be reached out to find out why they were not satisfied. 
After the MVP launch, the startup loses control on who uses its product. This is why 
segmentation preparation is vital too; the product might summon target groups not yet 
identified and business-wise unnecessary traffic (i.e. bot traffic) as well. To avoid errors 
in metrics interpretation, these segments have to be divided from each other and their 
metrics treated differently. 
Because of all the mentioned reasons, a solid conversion dashboard for exploring met-
rics and making conclusions based on them is needed. 
5.4.4 The MVP interview 
Before launching the MVP, it’s advisable to seek confirmation for the development from 
early adopters face-to-face. After learning from them, design, positioning and pricing 
can still be refined for the proper MVP launch. 
The marketing website, conversion dashboard and the MVP itself are all needed for a 
proper set of MVP interviews. The goal is to sign the prospect up for the product or the 
service, and whilst doing that, test messaging, price point and activation workflow. It’s 
particularly vital to conduct these interviews in person. 
In an MVP, the risk control questions the entrepreneur is looking for answers to are fol-
lowing: 
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• Does the landing page get noticed, do customers fluently get through the activation 
funnel, are there usability flaws and does the MVP demonstrate and deliver on the 
Unique Value Proposition (product risk)? 
• Are the chosen channels going to generate the revenue stream targeted (customer 
risk)? 
• Is the price point on a correct level (market risk)? 
A following framework of an MVP interview is workable for getting these answers: 
1. Welcome: the brief 
2. Showing the landing page: finding out if the product promise is clear and if the call-
to-action click is the natural next step 
3. Showing the pricing page: finding out what the interviewee thinks about the price 
point 
4. Signup and activation workflow: making sure that the prospect navigates through the 
funnel correctly 
5. The wrap-up: what did the customer think about the process, what can be improved 
and is he or she aware what will happen next? 
6. Result documentation 
5.4.5 Customer lifecycle validation 
The last step before the MVP launch is to validate the customer lifecycle and improve 
all the steps needed to ensure that the MVP really works when it’s launched. In other 
words, the customer lifecycle needs to be validated onwards. 
Firstly, giving and receiving feedback from customers has to be made effortless. Easy-
to-use feedback channels give the customers the picture that they are being cared 
about. The amount of feedback or support likely won’t, at this early stage, cause a sca-
ling problem of too many contacts. In addition, tech support is a good channel of gai-
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ning feature feedback and, at its best, can accelerate learning on technology-related 
issues of the product. It also offers an opportunity to ask questions from interested 
prospects and increase commitment, referral and goodwill - tech support is a marketing 
channel as well. 
If a trial period is being used, active troubleshooting should be applied immediately 
when possible. First objective is to reduce churn and abandonment on acquisition and 
activation paths, moving then on to increasing retention and engagement, getting paid, 
and collect favorable customer testimonials. 
Validating and troubleshooting the acquisition and activation paths 
The primary objective of validating and troubleshooting the acquisition and activation 
paths is to make sure enough traffic is driven to keep the learning cycle running. Exa-
mining the possible flaws in the process allows the entrepreneur to find out where the 
users drop off the acquisition / activation funnel if they do - and more importantly, whe-
re it happens the most. One should try to identify certain patterns in this; for instance 
do certain types of users (e.g. mobile / desktop platform users) have higher drop-off 
rates than others? 
When the problematic user groups have been specified, the next step is to extract a list 
of users that experienced the most failures at particular steps in the funnel and contact 
them. Only by reaching out to them and finding out why this happened, needed correc-
ting operations can be done and the errors fixed. 
Validating and troubleshooting the retention path 
The priority when validating and troubleshooting the retention part of the funnel is to 
get users to really use the product during the trial period. Email is a viable channel for 
such reminders as it can be automated, tracked and measured and reaches out to lar-
gely everyone. Email optimization can be applied for instance in a marketing automa-
tion platform to automatically send correct types of messages depending on the pros-
pect’s stage in the funnel. 
Other important aspect of this is to reach out and follow up with the early adopters and 
get their qualitative feedback on the service. 
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Validating and troubleshooting the revenue path 
The goal of validating and troubleshooting the revenue part of the funnel is to ensure 
that the entrepreneur is getting paid by the users. This in mind, a payment system has 
to be implemented at the latest in this stage. Reaching out to paying customers and 
talking to them is vital in order to figure out details such as how they heard about the 
product, why they did the purchase and what could be improved further on. 
Contacting the ”lost sales” leads is equally important, from the learning perspective and 
as well because they could be talked over. 
Validating and troubleshooting the referral path 
In this last part of the funnel, the idea is to get customer testimonials to be used as 
third-party recommendations on the marketing website. Short paragraphs by happy 
customers on positive experiences are sufficient enough. 
5.5 The MVP launch 
Maurya (2012) determines that the product is ready for the MVP launch, when at least 
80% of the early adopter group consistently makes it through the conversion funnel. 
More specifically, they should be able to fluently understand the Unique Value Proposi-
tion (UVP), sign up successfully, accept the pricing model, make it all the way through 
the activation workflow and provide positive feedback when asked. 
Right before the launch (when being confident that the MVP works), the entrepreneur’s 
final step is to revisit the acquisition channels to make sure a constant stream of poten-
tial prospects are entering the conversion funnel. This is not, however, the best time for 
channel optimization. The primary channels can be supplemented by secondary chan-
nels, if needed - the goal is to establish just enough traffic to learn more after the 
launch and then validate the next steps to reach the Product/Market fit. If one has ma-
naged to establish a large pool of warm prospects, early access signups can be at-
tempted to acquire from these leads before the actual MVP launch. 
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5.6 Feature iteration towards the product/market fit 
The product/market fit can only be reached via systematical iteration and validation. 
After the MVP has been launched, various procedures are yet to be made in order to 
find the optimal scaling point. These steps mainly follow the learning-based iteration 
process introduced in this thesis. 
5.6.1 Feature development 
In a great market - a market with plenty of real potential customers, the market pulls 
the product out of the startup without unnecessary feature-pushing (Andreesen, 2007). 
After the launch, usually feature requests start to pour in and the customers have diffe-
rent desires and expectations concerning the product development. The obvious reac-
tion of a startup is to build more features, but that is usually not the smartest road to 
take. Too much features quickly make the UVP complicated and software development 
of new features takes time compared to troubleshooting the errors identified. Future 
feature ideas should be treated like experiments - kept in the backlog until further prio-
rity has been determined. Building and validating multiple features can become an ”ad-
diction” of a kind and lead to waste (Yoskovitz, 2009). 
Maurya (2012) recommends an 80-20 -rule in feature development - 80% of the ent-
repreneur’s time should be concentrated to measuring and improving existing features, 
whereas 20% of energy and time should go on developing new ones. 
A good practice for constraining the features pipeline is to use the classic Kanban 
board system. A Kanban board is a workflow visualization tool that gives a good 
chance to optimize the flow of work (Leankit, 2017). Simply enough, the Kanban cards 
are moved in the board from left to right as they reach a new stage of development. 
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Picture 5: Kanban board (Denver Peak Academy, 2015) 
A Kanban board helps with feature tracking very much in the same way that a conver-
sion dashboard helps with marketing metrics. In this context, the buckets could be such 
as ”Backlog”, ”In Progress” and ”Done”. 
All potential features (improvements to existing features, customer feature requests, 
own feature wishes such as nice-to-haves identified earlier) start from the backlog, 
which should be in decent priority order all the time. Before going any further, its impor-
tant to analyze whether the feature is important enough in the first place to be imple-
mented. One method for measuring this is to think it through the concept of a ”Minimal 
Marketable Feature”, MMF. Minimal Marketable Feature is the smallest portion of work 
that provides value for customers - if it’s remarkable enough to cause a need for any 
marketing, it’s remarkable enough to be implemented (Denne & Cleland-Huang, 2003). 
A good test to find out whether the feature is an MMF or not is to think about whether 
it’d be worthy enough for announcing it in a blog post, newsletter, video or such. Featu-
res too tiny to mention are not worth developing. 
From the backlog the features move on to the ”In Progress” -stage. The ”In Progress” -
stage obviously holds in multiple of sub-steps, such as coding and deploying. The idea 
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of the Kanban board is that it only allows a certain number of projects to fit in a certain 
stage, allowing to maximize throughput while minimizing waste. Maurya (2012) sees 
that a suitable size for the ”In Progress” -bucket in the early stage would be one feature 
per founder / team member. The work-in-progress -limit effectively maintains the need 
for thorough examination of feature requests, as they have to be carefully prioritized 
from the MMF perspective. 
In the ”In Progress” -stage, developing features that are customer-initiated starts with 
contacting the customer and ensuring that the problem is correctly understood on the 
both sides of the table. This serves for finding the root cause of the problem - though 
the customer might be asking for a specific solution, a more effective way of solving the 
problem could also exist. Also, making the customer to sell the need for the problem 
helps to distinguish the nice-have -features from the must-have -ones. 
Internal feature requests are not to be treated any differently; in this context the other 
team members will do the work introduced in the previous paragraph. 
The features that are really worth solving, move on to the mock-up -stage in which a 
sketch of the solution is conducted. After the mock-up is ready, an interview resembling 
the Solution interview takes place and validates the solution through the iteration 
process. Only after this validation the building of the feature, such as coding, takes 
place. 
When the feature is ready and established, it’s moved to the ”Done” -bucket and relea-
sed. Partial rollout is a smart move deployment -wise, as it allows for A/B -testing with a 
few target groups: do customers really act differently with the feature or without it and 
what is the effect on the workflow or metrics such as revenue? These results might as 
well vary depending on the customer segments. The final validation is made through 
usability interviews similar to the MVP interview to correct errors and make final chan-
ges before full-on feature rollout. 
Quantitative verification is needed in the feature development as well, so after the full 
rollout the metrics need to be compared in a larger scale. 
5.6.2 Feature request prioritization 
Upon arrival, the feature requests have to be carefully analyzed to determine what 
should be done with them. The first phase is to compare the request against the pro-
duct’s immediate needs an priorities; whether it’s the right time for this specific action or 
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not. After that, it’s vital to consider whether the feature requested is essentially a minor 
bug or a more relevant MMF. Emergency situations, such as workflow crashes, ob-
viously ought to be fixed right away - the others will go to the backlog bucket of the 
Kanban board. 
TURUN AMK:N OPINNÄYTETYÖ | Henri Johansson
!50
6. REACHING THE PRODUCT/MARKET FIT 
Via constant learning, rigorous iteration, careful validation and hard work, the startup 
finally begins to get closer to the Product/Market fit - the point where scaling of the 
business could start. The first step in defining when this point has been reached is to 
set a metric to measure it. Only with a decisive metric the founders can systematically 
iterate toward achieving the Product/Market fit. Andreesen (2007) defined Product/
Market fit widely by being in a good market fit a product that can satisfy that market, 
but more concrete goals have to be set to measure the Product/Market fit. 
The American entrepreneur, angel investor and startup advisor Sean Ellis has a viable 
model for this, in the form of a qualitative survey to find out if the product has enough 
traction. The very key question in this survey is ”How would you feel if you cold no lon-
ger use the product?”, in which the customers have following alternatives to answer 
with: 
1. Very disappointed 
2. Somewhat disappointed 
3. Not disappointed (it isn’t really that useful) 
4. N/A - I no longer use the product 
If the finding is that more than 40% of users say that they’d be ”very disappointed” wit-
hout the product, there’s a great chance a sustainable and scalable customer acquisi-
tion growth can be built (Ellis, 2010). 
Ellis determined the 40% benchmark by comparing the results of hundreds of startups. 
He concluded that the startups reaching results above 40% in this survey generally are 
able to scale the business, whereas companies with results under 40% consistently 
struggle with scaling issues. 
The test requires the results to be of statistical significance, so a large enough sample 
size has to be formed - with various customer segments represented. When close 
enough to the Product/Market fit, the test helps the validation, but until then more itera-
tion is needed. 
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6.1 Steering the product toward Product/Market fit 
Iteration toward Product/Market fit happens by following the customer lifecycle conver-
sion metrics. The two key metrics to measure are activation and retention, which toget-
her make up the value metrics. 
The revenue metric, as valid as it is in many ways, does not necessarily correlate well 
with the Product/Market fit because of multiple simple reasons. Someone else might be 
paying for the product on behalf of the customer, or they might as well just forget to 
cancel the subscription. The customers surprisingly often do keep paying for products 
they don’t use. While revenue is the first form of validation, retention is the ultimate 
form of validation (Maurya, 2012). Furthermore, in one-time products that are bought 
without a subscription, the revenue will follow the Product/Market fit whereas in mul-
tiple-use products it will follow activation and retention. In short, decent revenue is a 
result of finding the Product/Market fit, not vice versa. 
Maurya (2012) recommends a following iteration framework in order to determine if 
Product/Market fit has been reached: 
1. Conversion dashboard results need to be reviewed as frequently as on a weekly ba-
sis 
2. The feature development backlog has to be effectively prioritized 
3. Formulating bold hypotheses and testing them with the smallest things possible to 
build to run the experiment 
4. Reviewing all the features constantly to ensure that they have a positive impact (the 
features that don’t have to be reworked upon or killed) 
5. Monitoring the value metrics - activation and retention - and making sure they grow 
steadily 
6. Running the Sean Ellis test when the retention numbers approach 40% 
The early traction exit criteria are: 
• 40% retention of users 
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• Passing the Sean Ellis test. 
When these two criteria have been met, the Product/Market fit has been found.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
Finding the Product/Market fit is the first significant milestone and an invaluable achie-
vement in the lifetime of a startup, because it allows the company to start scaling. Befo-
re achieving sustainable growth, for instance churn and cost of customer acquisition as 
well as viral coefficients and customer lifetime value -related metrics still probably have 
to be concentrated in, but the real remarkable accomplishment is to build something 
that the people want to buy and credibly confirm it. When demonstrated, this early trac-
tion - the Product/Market fit - gives the entrepreneur a permission to shift toward achie-
ving sustainable growth via a scalable business model.  
When reaching Product/Market fit, at least some level of success is almost guaranteed 
and with continuous tuning of growth engines a startup is able to cross the chasm 
between early adopters and mainstream customers. The key is to build a culture of 
constant learning and follow the framework in a thorough manner.  
No methodology can promise absolute success, but the Lean Startup and Running 
Lean philosophies provide a repeatable process and an actionable model for building 
products that achieve the Product/Market fit and then can be scaled to produce promi-
nent revenue. 
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